



R A U L P R E B I S C H 
Technical Editor 
A D O L F O G U R R I E R I 
UNITED NATIONS 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA 
SANTIAGO, CHILE/ FIRST HALF OF 1978 
S U M A R I O 
Basic needs or comprehensive development 7 
Sidney Dell 
Between reality and utopia. The dialectics of the Social sciences in Latin 
America 35 
Jorge Graciarena 
External finance and commercial banks. Their role in Latin America's 
capacity to. import between 1951 and 1975 63 
Robert Devlin 
Informal-formal sector interrelationships 99 
Victor Tokman 
Transnational corporations and export-oriented primary commodities 135 
Benny Widyono 
Prices and gains in the world coffee trade 161 
Alberto Orlandi 
Wage disparities in the urban labour market 199 
Paulo R. Souza 
The international Monetary Fund in a new international financial constel-
lation: An interpretational commentary 225 
David H. Pollock and Carlos Massad 
Some CEPAL publications 231 
Other publications 247 
CEPAL REVIEW 




S h o u l d U N D P have a 
deve lopment strategy? 
Sidney Dell"11 
In recent years widespread interest has 
been shown in the development strategy 
which focuses on the satisfaction of basic 
needs. However, the sympathy that its 
content of social justice arouses should be 
no bar to critical analysis whereby 
attention can be drawn to the operational 
and strategic difficulties it entails. 
This is the object of the present 
article. The author begins by presenting 
the practical problems that a basic needs 
strategy would encounter if an attempt 
were made to turn it into an efficient 
planning instrument, and shows that it 
has considerable shortcomings in concep-
tual respects as well as from the 
standpoints of measurement and of 
implementation. Nevertheless, the strate-
gical problems which are subsequently 
analysed present even greater difficulties. 
Among these problems three of the most 
important are discussed: the relation 
between economic growth and satisfac-
tion of basic needs; the choice between 
present and future consumption; and, 
lastly, the development pattern which 
this strategy proposes. In connexion with 
this last topic, which may be regarded as 
the core of the article, the author recalls 
well-known dichotomies such as industri-
al development or rural development, use 
of capital-intensive or of labour-intensive 
technologies, and so on. In conclusion he 
suggests that the international agencies 
should proceed with caution and humility 
in tackling the complex problem of basic 
needs. 
*Staff member, United Nations Centre on 
Transnational Corporations. 
Introduction 
1. What is a basic needs strategy?1 
Strong political, intellectual and moral 
forces have been mobilized in favour of a 
basic needs strategy of development, and 
the strategy was given powerful endorse-
ment by the World Employment Confer-
ence and by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in 1976. The present 
essay seeks to question not at all the goal 
of more equitable development policies 
bu t the general framework within which 
such policies have been presented for the 
consideration of the international com-
munity. It also indicates some of the 
pitfalls awaiting international develop-
ment agencies if they limit themselves to 
a particular development strategy - t h e 
basic needs strategy or any o t h e r - as a 
guide for their operations. 
One of the difficulties in getting to 
grips with this elusive subject is that the 
idea of a basic needs strategy means 
different things to different people. For 
some it is a basically humanitarian issue, 
a categorical imperative that transcends 
all other considerations. To others it 
represents a fundamental reordering of 
development priorities, often assigning a 
leading role to rural development. Some 
1
 This is a revised and extended version of 
an address given by the author on 10 December 
1976 to the Thirteenth Policy Forum of the 
United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). The views expressed are those of the 
author, and do not necessarily represent the 
views of the UN or UNDP. The author 
gratefully acknowledges valuable comments 
received from Shahen Abrahamian, Michael 
Dell, Gerald Helleiner, Paul Streeten and 
Laurence Whitehead; he has benefited particu-
larly from reading certain unpublished papers 
by Paul Streeten. The author alone is 
responsible for any errors or shortcomings that 
remain. 
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members of the latter school completely 
reject the development path traced by 
the industrially advanced countries of 
today, while others take a less radical 
position. A curious feature of the 
strategy is that it finds supporters in all 
parts of the political spectrum from left 
to right, and in all schools of economic 
thought, from dirigiste to laissez-faire, 
and from neo-classical to neo-marxist. In 
the discussion that follows, mention will 
be made of several of the above schools, 
and it is inevitable that points made in 
relation to one school may be less 
applicable, or even quite inapplicable, to 
another. 
Perhaps the best-known exposition 
of a basic needs strategy is that 
contained in a report submitted in March 
1976 by the Director-General of the ILO 
to the World Employment Conference. 
It was proposed to the Conference in the 
report in question that "development 
planning should include, as an explicit 
goal, the satisfaction of an absolute level 
of basic needs".2 In this context, basic 
needs are considered to include two 
elements: 
"First, they include certain mini-
mum requirements of a family for 
private consumption: adequate food, 
shelter and clothing, as well as 
certain household equipment and 
furniture. Second, they include es-
sential services provided by and for 
the community at large, such as safe 
drinking-water, sanitation, public 
transport and health, educational 
and cultural facilities".3 
2
 Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: 
A One-World Problem, International Labour 
Office, Geneva, 1976, p. 31. 
3
 This is the definition of basic needs 
adopted by the World Employment Confer-
These goals should be achieve, in the 
view of the ILO staff, within one 
generation, or by the year 2000. To that 
end there was a need for measures aimed 
at changing the pattern of growth and of 
the use of productive resources by the 
various income groups - including, in a 
number of cases, "an initial redistri-
bution of resources, in particular land".4 
Additional elements would be the 
provision of adequate employment 
opportunities for the unemployed and 
underemployed, the introduction of the 
"right kind of technology" and "quite 
high levels of investment, without which 
there would be neither growth nor 
meaningful redistribution".5 
The literature on poverty-oriented 
development contrasts these approaches 
with those of the past. It is suggested 
that past strategies sought maximum 
growth at any price and that questions 
of social equity were ignored. These 
strategies were, it is believed, based on 
the assumption that the benefits of high 
rates of growth would somehow "trickle 
down" to the low-income groups. It was 
also assumed, according to the critics, 
that the gross national product (GNP) 
was a satisfactory measure of develop-
ment and that if real GNP grew at an 
adequate rate, this in itself implied that 
development was proceeding satisfac-
torily. All this, said the critics, was quite 
wrong. The growth process had often 
bypassed the poorer members of the 
community: the latter would benefit 
from growth only if distributional goals 
were made a deliberate and explicit 
element of policy. It was said to be 
ence, which is virtually the same as that 
proposed by the ILO staff (Ibid., p. 32). 
4
 Ibid., p. 43. 
5
 Ibid. 
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necessary to dethrone "King GNP" and 
enthrone "basic needs" in its place. 
Certainly, there are countries where 
it was considered essential to establish 
the growth process on a secure and 
self-sustaining basis before proceeding 
to any redistribution of income. In 
Brazil, for example, the argument was 
advanced that the release of resources 
for investment in growth required the 
enforcement of strict austerity, and that 
any effort to improve present welfare 
through a 'premature' redistribution of 
income, or through wage 'prodigality', 
was incompatible with the maximization 
of future welfare.6 
2. The International 
Development Strategy 
But it would be a mistake to suppose 
that growth-at-any-price, or the trickle-
down approach, was either explicit or 
implicit in the United Nations interna-
tional Development Strategy. 
The Strategy adopted by the General 
Assembly for the 1970s has the fol-
lowing major statement in the preamble: 
"Governments designate the 1970s 
as the Second United Nations 
Development Decade and pledge 
themselves, individually and collecti-
vely, to pursue policies designed to 
create a more just and rational world 
economic and social order in which 
equality of opportunities should be 
as much a prerogative of nations as 
of individuals within a nation."7 
6
 See Mario Henrique Simonsen, Brasil 
2000, Rio de Janeiro, 1969, p. 285. Mr. 
Somonsen later became Minister of Finance of 
Brazil. 
7
 General Assembly resolution 2626 
(XXV). 
In defining the content of the above 
declaration so far as "individuals within 
a nation" are concerned, the Strategy 
places in the forefront of national 
objectives, along with the promotion of 
higher growth rates, a more equitable 
distribution of income and wealth. 
Moreover, "qualitative and structural 
changes in the society must go hand in 
hand with rapid economic growth, and 
existing disparities -regional, sectoral 
and social— should be substantially 
reduced". To this end, the Strategy calls 
for measures to reduce unemployment 
and underemployment; to improve the 
quality of education; to raise general 
levels of health and sanitation; to 
improve levels of nutrition, placing 
special emphasis on the needs of 
vulnerable groups; to expand and im-
prove housing facilities, especially for 
low-income groups; to foster the well-
being of children and the participation 
of youth; and to integrate women fully 
in the development effort.8 
The General Assembly Strategy was 
drafted with the assistance of the 
Committee for Development Planning at 
sessions held in 1969-1970, under the 
chairmanship of Professor Jan Tin-
bergen. The report of the sixth session 
included the following assertion: "It 
cannot be over-emphasized that what 
development implies for the developing 
countries is not simple increase in 
productive capacity but major transfor-
mation in their social and economic 
Ibid., paragraphs 12 and 18. Paragraph 71 
calls for particular efforts "to expand low-cost 
housing through both public and private 
programmes and on a self-help basis, including 
through co-operatives, utilizing as much as 
possible local raw materials and labour-intensive 
techniques". Paragraph 68 calls for national 
targets for the provision of potable water. 
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structures."9 It was therefore necessary 
to eliminate the dualism between the 
traditional economy and the modern 
sector. A separate section of the report 
was devoted to methods of improving 
income distribution and providing for 
the needs of the people in the fields of 
employment, education, health and 
housing. "The glaring inequalities in the 
distribution of income and wealth 
prevailing in the developing countries 
will have to be eliminated... It is a fallacy 
that more rapid growth and reduction of 
inequalities of income and wealth are 
necessarily competing elements."1 ° 
National measures to this end should 
include "activation of broad masses of 
the population and assurances of satis-
faction of their primary needs and 
aspirations".11 As for "King GNP", 
Tinbergen and his colleagues had this to 
say: "Although the rate of growth of 
gross product per head is by no means an 
adequate indicator of economic and 
social progress -since it does not reflect 
such major conditions of development as 
income redistribution or structural 
change- it is the one aggregate indicator 
which comes closest to providing some 
quantitative impression of the under-
lying change.'"2 
3. The real issues 
The real issues between the basic needs 
9
 United Nations Committee for Develop-
ment Planning, Report of the sixth session 
(5-15 January 1970), document E/4776, 
paragraph 14. The other members of the 
Committee were Gamani Corea, Nazih Deif, 
A.N. Efimov, Paul Kaya, J.A. Lacarte, J.H. 
Mensah, Saburo Okita, Josef Pajestka, M.L. 
Qureshi, K.N. Raj, Jean Ripert, Germánico 
Salgado, Jakov Sirotkovic, Zdenek Vergner. 
10
 Ibid., paragraphs 28-29. 
11
 Ibid., paragraph 41. 
12
 Ibid., paragraph 16. 
strategists and those who favour com-
prehensive development policies lie not 
in the goal of social equity, which is 
common ground between them, but in 
the means for achieving that goal. 
There are three main issues. The first 
relates to the need for higher or 
accelerated rates of growth: some of the 
basic needs strategists agree in attaching 
importance to such objectives, but 
others seem not to do so. A second issue, 
closely related to the first, is whether the 
pre-empting of resources for the attain-
ment of a minimum absolute level of 
consumption in the nearest possible 
future would entail a lower rate of 
growth than would otherwise be possible 
as well as socially acceptable, and hence 
would imply a lower level of provision 
for the basic needs of future generations. 
Are there not societies that, if they 
could control their own destinies, would 
certainly seek the reduction of inequa-
lity, but would also prefer to tighten 
their belts a little more now in the 
interests of more adequate provision for 
the future? 
The third issue arises out of the 
opinion held by many of the basic needs 
strategists, as noted earlier, that the road 
to development adopted by the present 
high-income countries is inappropriate 
for the developing countries of today; 
and that the current maldistribution of 
income is due largely to the development 
of modern industrial sectors, employing 
capital-intensive techniques, accom-
panied by neglect of rural areas. Some of 
those who take this view play down 
large-scale industrial growth and focus 
their attention on rural development. 
Others recognize the need for rapid 
industrial progress, but consider that it 
needs to be reoriented in a labour-
intensive direction. 
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I 
Operational difficulties 
1. Basic needs: the meaning 
of absolutism 
Before embarking on an examination of 
these issues, it is important to note some 
of the difficulties in the use of 'basic 
needs' as an operational tool for 
planning. There are difficulties of con-
cept, of measurement, and of imple-
mentation. 
As to the concept, the Director-
General of the ILO suggested to the 
World Employment Conference that 
there are certain minimum levels of 
personal consumption and access to 
social services that should be adopted 
"as minimum targets for raising the 
living standards of the very poor for the 
entire international community".13 It is, 
however, difficult to envisage how such 
universally applicable targets would be 
defined. Differences in climate alone 
result in different minimum require-
ments for calorie intake and clothing. 
Would not additional differences arise 
owing, if not to intercountry differences 
in levels of income, then at least to 
differences in social and cultural tra-
ditions and circumstances? In fact, the 
World Employment Conference rejected 
the idea of a worldwide standard and 
invited each country to set its own 
standard. 
But how is such a minimum standard 
to be established, even for a single 
country? No doubt the idea of a 
minimum standard of nutrition is ac-
ceptable — although even here one runs 
into difficulties, as we shall see. But as 
1 3
 Op. cit., p. 7. 
soon as one includes such items as 
shelter and clothing, and even household 
equipment and furniture, as the World 
Employment Conference did, the line to 
be drawn between basic and non-basic 
needs is bound to be arbitrary. If 
'absolute* norms are set for such 
non-food items, does this mean that 
attainment of the norms must constitute 
a prior claim on resources, to be 
pre-empted for that purpose regardless 
of all other needs, however pressing? 
Equally arbitrary is the setting of 
absolute standards for the essential 
services that appear on the ILO list of 
basic needs. In the case of educational 
and cultural facilities, for example, it 
would be odd to define standards in the 
abstract without taking into account the 
alternative goods or services that would 
have to be forgone —even by the poorest 
20 per cent of the population- in order 
to attain them. 
Even if certain norms for basic needs 
had been generally agreed upon in a 
particular country, the question would 
still arise as to how rapidly the minimum 
standards should be achieved. Should all 
resources be allocated for the quickest 
possible attainment of the chosen goals, 
or would it be permissible to use 
resources for other valid development 
programmes? As regards nutrition, for 
example, should all food exports be 
discontinued irrespective of the degree 
of essentiality of the counterpart im-
ports? And should the entire proceeds 
of non-food exports be used for the 
purchase of food - up to the point at 
which every man, woman and child was 
adequately fed? If not, what degree of 
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provision for the foods needs of the poor 
could be regarded as 'adequate' in the 
immediate future, and how soon should 
the norms be attained? 
There are other conceptual diffi-
culties in interpreting the 'absolutism' of 
basic needs. Does it mean that no-one 
should be allowed a level of con-
sumption in excess of basic needs until 
every member of the community has 
reached that level? If not, what degree 
of 'excess consumption' should be 
permitted, and where does one draw the 
line between tolerable and intolerable 
degrees of inequality? If 'excess con-
sumption' can be allowed, is it also 
acceptable to provide for 'excess in-
vestment' in the sense of investment not 
required to meet basic needs? If so, how 
much 'excess investment' is tolerable? 
And in what respect is a basic needs 
strategy that permits excess con-
sumption and investment preferable to a 
comprehensive strategy that seeks to 
deploy available resources for the attain-
ment of all socially acceptable ends, 
including basic needs? 
A further difficulty arises for the 
many countries at the lower end of the 
resource and income scale. How are 
they to determine the particular package 
or combination of basic needs, the 
satisfaction of which should constitute 
their overall minimum target? What are 
the relative priorities to be assigned to 
such items as public health and sani-
tation, potable water supplies, public 
transport, housing, and household equip-
ment? What should be the tradeoffs 
between these items at the margin, and 
what resources should be invested in 
each? 
Answers to these extremely difficult 
questions of judgement are not made 
any easier by the assertion that absolute 
standards must prevail. The use of the 
term 'absolute' has no meaning without 
a time dimension, and once it is 
acknowledged that the fixing of the time 
dimension involves decisions on overall 
development requirements and not 
merely on basic needs, it will be 
apparent that a basic needs strategy must 
form part of a comprehensive develop-
ment strategy. As such, basic needs are 
no longer absolute but relative, and there 
is no valid difference between the 
Development Decade strategies and basic 
needs strategies except possibly in 
emphasis. 
2. Setting the standards 
Problems of measurement of basic needs, 
though not fundamental, are far from 
trivial for what is intended as an 
operational approach to planning. One 
might think that at least in the case of 
food consumption, quantitative targets 
would be readily available. Surely there 
is some minimum intake of food below 
which people can be said to be 
under-nourished, and it should clearly be 
a primary and overriding objective to 
ensure that even the poorest of the poor 
do not suffer from malnutrition. 
On closer examination, however, it 
appears that the setting of absolute 
standards even for food consumption 
poses unexpected problems. According 
to a report published in February 1977 
by the staff of the Select Committee on 
Nutrition and Human Needs of the 
United States Senate, "there is only 
limited knowledge of human requi-
rements for most nutrients". An ap-
pendix to the report prepared by the 
Nutrition Institute of the United States 
Department of Agriculture describes the 
state of knowledge even on total human 
energy requirements as "fragmentary" 
except for school-age and adolescent 
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children and for young adults.14 If the 
gaps in knowledge of nutritional requi-
rements are so great in the United States, 
in developing countries such knowledge 
may be even more inadequate, since 
requirements in one country are not 
applicable elsewhere because of diffe-
rences in climate and other factors. 
It turns out, moreover, that the 
record of institutions responsible for 
reaching conclusions in this field has 
been one of continual, and generally 
downward, revision. The changes in 
assessments made have, in fact, been 
surprisingly large, suggesting that the 
scientific basis of the assessments is still 
quite shaky. As Thomas T. Poleman has 
pointed out, "the energy allowances for 
the United States 'reference man' - i n his 
twenties, moderately active, weighing 70 
kilogrammes- now stand at 2,700 
calories daily, 500 calories less than in 
the 1953 recommendation": in other 
words, there has been a 15-per-cent 
reduction in the twenty-one years up to 
1974. Poleman goes on to note that in 
1974 FAO estimated that perhaps a 
quarter of the population of the 
developing world (excluding China) were 
inadequately fed, while the corres-
ponding estimate in 1963 had been at 
least 60 per cent. Poleman shows further 
that "depending on your assumptions 
you can prove beyond a statistical doubt 
that 43 per cent of Ceylonese suffer 
protein-calorie malnutrition or none 
do".15 
14
 Dietary Goals for the United States, 
Report prepared by the staff of the Select 
Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, 
United States Senate, Washington D.C., United 
States Government Printing Office, February 
1977, p. 20 and Appendix C. 
15
 Thomas T. Poleman, "World Food: 
Myth and Reality", World Development, vol. 5, 
No 5-7, May-July 1977, pp. 385-386. It also 
This does not, of course, mean that 
the problem of malnutrition is not 
extremely grave and worrying. What the 
foregoing discussion does, however, 
show is that the scientific, statistical and 
analytical foundations for a basic needs 
strategy are extraordinarily weak even in 
the sector where they should presumably 
be strongest —namely, that of food 
consumption-, while in other sectors 
they are non-existent. Let us imagine 
that the basic needs strategists had won 
their battle against the G N P-at-any-cost 
school (sic) in 1963 instead of thirteen 
years later in 1976. The planners in 
developing countries in 1963 would have 
been told to pre-empt the resources 
required to eliminate malnutrition 
among 60 per cent of the population, 
whereas the true dimensions of malnu-
trition must have been very much 
smaller.16 No doubt this would have 
been beneficial to the extent that 
malnutrition, where it existed, might 
have been reduced more quickly, and 
that elsewhere food consumption might 
have advanced beyond minimum levels. 
But the more important point in the 
present context is that choices would 
appears that there may have been widespread 
underestimation of calorie intake in the 
developing world owing to inadequate sampling 
of food interns consumed. For example, a study 
on Kerala has shown that this factor has been 
responsible for a 30-per-cent underestimation 
of food consumption in that state. See United 
Nations, Poverty, Unemployment and Develop-
ment Policy: A Case Study of Selected Issues 
with reference to Kerala, United Nations 
publication, Sales N°.: E. 75.IV. 11, pp. 1, 22-
24, 34-35. 
16
 This would be true even after making a 
generous allowance for the increase in per 
capita consumption from 1963 to 1974, when 
the proportion of malnutrition was estimated at 
one quarter. 
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have been made and strategies devised on 
the basis of data that were quite wrong, 
and wrong by a very large margin. 
3. Implementing a basic 
needs strategy 
The problem of ensuring that basic needs 
are met even among the poorest 
members of the community is complex, 
especially since the requisite systems and 
channels of distribution would have to 
be provided or created. What would be 
the respective roles of governments and 
the private sector? Distribution of 
foodstuffs might be undertaken directly 
by government entities, and provision 
for educational, health and housing 
requirements might also be a government 
responsibility. But in most if not all 
countries governments are not likely to 
be involved in the distribution of other 
essential goods and services, such as 
household furniture and equipment, and 
clothing. To this extent income sup-
plements or subsidies might have to be 
provided to those lacking employment 
and to those for whom employment 
does not provide sufficient monetary 
income. Some countries might prefer to 
use income supplements or subsidies to 
cover food needs also. 
Of course the fact that a minimum 
ration of goods and services is distribut-
ed, or that income supplements or 
subsidies are provided, does not mean 
that the recipients will necessarily enjoy 
the corresponding benefits. If they are 
extremely poor and, as is often the case 
in such circumstances, heavily in debt, 
they may sell part or all of the income in 
kind in order to service their debts, and 
use money income for the same purpose. 
Thus the basic needs of the poorest 
will be satisfied only if broader condi-
tions are conducive to that end, and this 
in turn implies fundamental social and 
structural change, and a rate of growth 
of the economy sufficient for progressive 
absorption of the unemployed and 
underemployed into remunerative em-
ployment. In other words, it emerges 
here also that the satisfaction of basic 
needs can be secured only in the context 
of a broader process of comprehensive 
change and development, and that 
efforts to give an 'absolute' priority to 




1. Growth and development 
Thus far, reasons have been given for 
doubting whether the satisfaction of 
'basic needs* for consumption of particu-
lar goods and services can be regarded as 
an overriding priority even in a society 
with egalitarian development objectives. 
We may now revert to the three issues 
raised earlier with respect to a basic 
needs strategy, beginning with the 
problem of growth and development. 
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It is often difficult to determine 
what exactly the stand of the basic needs 
strategists on this problem is. They 
deplore 'growth-at-any-price', as any 
sensible person would, but their own 
overall prescription for growth is usually 
obscure. This obscurity is a matter of 
concern in itself, since no strategy for 
overcoming poverty is worthy of the 
name if it does not indicate the means 
whereby the requisite rate of growth is 
to be attained. It is striking that the ILO 
report's summary of the six "main 
ingredients of the proposed new ap-
proach to development" does not even 
mention either growth or industry.17 
The Director-General's introduction 
to the report suggests that measures to 
implement a basic needs strategy "need 
not imply a slower growth of output. 
They place greater emphasis on patterns 
of growth leading to a more equitable 
distribution of the gains from growth, 
and they may well lead to increasing 
growth rates as well".18 
The report itself, on the other hand, 
argues that "a rapid rate of economic 
growth is an essential part of a basic 
needs strategy".19 On the basis of 
certain econometric exercises, the con-
clusion is reached that "All these 
calculations, tentative though they may 
be, strongly suggest that in many 
countries minimum incomes and stand-
ards of living for the poor cannot be 
achieved, even by the year 2000, 
without some acceleration of present 
average rates of growth, accompanied by 
a number of measures aiming at changing 
the pattern of growth and use of 
17
 Employment, Growth and Basic Needs, 
op. cit., p. 68. 
19
 Ibid,, p. 8. 
19
 Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
productive resources by the various 
income groups".20 According to the 
report, moreover, the ILO is "forced 
reluctantly to conclude, from this 
model, that the growth target of the 
Second Development Decade [6 per cent 
per annum] is not consistent with the 
proposed objective of fulfilling basic 
needs within one generation".21 
The "reluctance" of the ILO to 
reach the above conclusion is note-
worthy. The context suggests that it 
would have been preferable if basic 
needs could have been satisfied through 
income redistribution, but in the light of 
available evidence the ILO judges that 
"the extent of redistribution that would 
be required would be such that social 
changes of this magnitude are unlikely to 
occur". The alternative, therefore, is to 
step up growth rates so that basic needs 
can be satisfied out of the additional 
resources thereby generated. 
But even if basic needs could be met 
entirely through redistribution of in-
come, would not higher growth rates be 
desirable as well, so as to shorten the 
transition period and attain the targets 
by, say, 1990 instead of by 2000? Can 
it not be that the Development Decade 
strategists knew what they were about in 
pressing for higher growth rates, even 
from the standpoint of effecting the 
redistribution of income required under 
the preamble and paragraph 18 of the 
Strategy? They pointed to the wide-
spread experience that at low rates of 
growth, a large part of the increasing 
labour force fails to find productive 
employment, and obstacles to economic 
and social mobility persist. Thus the 
absorption of underemployed labour, 
20
 Ibid,, p. 43. 
21
 Ibid., p. 43. In other words the 
6-per-cent growth target is insufficient. 
16 
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the redistribution of income and the 
acceleration of growth are interde-
pendent goals.22 
Already in 1970, when the Second 
Development Decade had barely begun, 
Raúl Prebisch was pointing out that the 
targets of the Decade were much too low 
to make any impact on the growing 
problem of unemployment and un-
deremployment or on the maldistri-
bution of income, Prebisch considered in 
the case of Latin America that a growth 
rate of 8 per cent would need to be 
attained by the end of the 1970s if the 
region was to proceed along a viable 
development path and if the benefits of 
development were to be widely 
shared.23 
2. The choice between present 
and future consumption 
Reference has already been made to the 
problems involved in determining the 
rate at which any particular level of basic 
consumption should be approached. 
Of course, the lower the level of 
consumption of basic essentials in any 
country, the more difficult will the 
people find it to release resources for 
investment. But if the basic needs 
22
 These points had been made as far back 
as 1963 by Raúl Prebisch at the outset of his 
study Towards a Dynamic Development Policy 
for Latin America, United Nations publication, 
Sales No.: 64.I1.G.4. As he saw it, the 
concentration of income and wealth in Latin 
America was inimical to development, and 
major structural changes were therefore re-
quired to eliminate poverty, along with 
measures to accelerate growth. 
23
 Raúl Prebisch, Change and Develop-
ment: Latin America's Great Task, Report 
submitted to the Inter-American Development 
Bank, Washington D.C. (mimeographed text), 
July 1970, chapter IV, passim, 
strategy were to be pressed to the point 
at which the attainment of minimum 
levels of nutrition, health, sanitation and 
education —to say nothing of household 
equipment and furniture- had to take 
priority over all other goals, some of the 
poorest societies might be condemned to 
an indefinite period of stagnation at the 
subsistence level, since virtually all 
resources might have to be pre-empted 
for consumption, little or nothing being 
set aside for investment in future growth 
and development. Even at the lowest 
levels of per capita income, countries in 
which social morale and sense of unity 
and purpose are high will deliberately 
forgo even essential items of con-
sumption, including food, if they feel 
that by so doing they can improve the 
prospects for their children. No interna-
tional agency has a right to tell such 
countries that there are absolute and 
overriding "basic needs" to which they 
must assign priority. They are entitled to 
define their development needs in terms 
relevant to their own goals and their own 
time horizons. 
Does the above imply acceptance of 
the view, cited earlier, that inequality of 
income distribution must be accepted in 
the short and medium run as part of the 
price to be paid for a high rate of growth 
and effective redistribution of income in 
the long run? Not at all. On the 
contrary, the greater the degree of 
austerity required in the interests of 
setting aside resources for the future, the 
more important is it to ensure that the 
burden is divided fairly, and in some 
reasonable relationship to the capacity 
to bear it. The argument that inequality 
is indispensable in achieving an adequate 
level of savings because the rich save a 
larger proportion of their incomes than 
the poor is unconvincing. Societies with 
a strong sense of common purpose are 
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quite capable of imposing the most 
stringent limits on consumption, on an 
egalitarian basis, as has been shown in 
time of war. Inequality, on the other 
hand, can be highly divisive and 
whatever may be gained in terms of 
savings ratios may be more than lost 
through lower labour productivity and 
even social strife. In many developing 
countries, moreover, the richer classes 
scarcely offer a model of thrift, but tend 
rather to squander large proportions of 
their incomes on luxury consumption. 
Thus the fact that a country prefers 
to postpone the attainment of basic 
needs targets in order to permit a more 
rapid rate of growth and structural 
transformation does not in the least 
imply that it thereby gives up ideas of 
social equity. 
Perhaps the basic needs doctrine can 
be adjusted to take all these broader 
considerations into account, so that, as 
suggested earlier, the goals are defined in 
the wider context of comprehensive 
development strategies for the society as 
a whole. Whether we speak of the 
equitable distribution of the benefits of 
total growth (as per the Development 
Decade resolution) or of the attainment 
of adequate levels of consumption in the 
context of overall development needs (as 
per the basic needs strategy suitably 
amended) is a matter of small moment. 
It is to be hoped that a reconciliation of 
approaches and strategies can be 
achieved in some such terms as these. 
3. The pattern of development 
The third and most complex of the 
issues raised by the basic needs school is 
that of the pattern of development. Is 
the inequitable distribution of the 
benefits from growth in many countries 
due to their having followed the example 
set by the industrially advanced coun-
tries, concentrating on the development 
of a modern sector, to the detriment of 
rural areas, where the majority of the 
population is to be found? 
According to the Twenty-fourth 
Pugwash Symposium, "a development 
strategy imitative of highly industria-
lized countries does not appear to be 
possible, necessary or even desirable for 
the majority of the developing coun-
tries"?4 According to the report "it is 
unlikely to be possible because the 
quantum of natural resources —both 
renewable and non-renewable— as well as 
of the resources of capital, technology 
and markets to which the developing 
world would need to have access in order 
to traverse successfully such an imitative 
road, is infinitely greater than the 
prevailing international political and 
economic order, dominated as it is by 
the demands (not needs) of the highly 
industrialized countries, will make avail-
able".25 It is not quite clear what is 
meant by the words "will make avail-
able", but what the above passage seems 
to be saying is that, in the first place, the 
natural resources of the world are 
insufficient to make it possible for 
developing countries to consume the 
Report of the Twenty-fourth Pugwash 
Symposium, Dar-es-Salaam, 2-6 June 1975, as 
published in World Development, vol. 5 N° 3, 
March 1977, p. 257. The participants in the 
Symposium were R. Andriambolona, O. Bassir, 
W.K. Chagula, Bernard T. Feld, L.K.H. Goma, 
M. Goldsmith, K.N. Hirji, M.M. Semakula 
Kiwanuka, I.M. Kaduma, I. Mann, P. Mwom-
bela, D. Nkunika, M.S. Ntamila, C.H.G. 
Oldham, S.J. Patel, A. Parthasarathi, J.F. 
Rweyemamu, F. Sagasti, A.R. Sidky, I. Sachs. 
The report was prepared by the Rapporteur of 
the Symposium, A. Parthasarathi. 
25
 Ibid. 
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same volume of material goods per 
capita as is currently consumed in the 
industrial countries. The insufficiency 
may be due simply to such factors as the 
exhaustion of available supplies of 
minerals; or perhaps the wording of the 
statement is to be understood as 
implying that those in control of the 
limited supplies available will not release 
them to meet the needs of the poor 
countries. Either way the thesis would 
appear to come close to saying that the 
developing countries had better content 
themselves with the natural resources, 
capital and technology that are left over 
after the demands of the industrial 
countries have been satisfied. 
If the foregoing interpretation is 
correct, the Pugwash Symposium was in 
effect giving a neo-Malthusian twist to 
the basic needs strategy. For the 
implication appears to be that in order 
to avoid the pressure of population on 
resources, the developing countries 
should adopt a development strategy 
that satisfies basic needs without seeking 
the high levels of material consumption 
characteristic of the industrial world. It 
is not possible to discuss the neo-
Malthusian theories in the present 
context, but they have been thoroughly 
refuted - most recently by Professor 
Wassily Leontief s study for the United 
Nations entitled The Future of the 
World Economy.26 Leontiefs study 
shows that resource constraints would 
not prevent the income gap between 
developed and developing countries from 
being reduced by half by the end of the 
present century, and eliminated by the 
middle of the next. 
26
 Wassily Leontief, The Future of the 
World Economy, Oxford University Press, 
1977. 
A low level of material consumption 
per capita may or may not be desirable 
for other reasons, but the case for it 
certainly cannot be based on a presump-
tion that supplies of food or natural 
resources would be inadequate. It is even 
less credible that shortages of capital or 
technology would impose such li-
mitations on consumption. 
Even if a development strategy 
imitative of the industrial countries were 
feasible, it would not, according to the 
Pugwash group, be desirable. This is 
"because of the acute concern in the 
highly industrialized countries them-
selves that the kind of natural resource-, 
energy- and technology-intensive de-
velopment strategy which they had 
adopted is not leading to genuine 
development - it is leading instead to 
growing personal and group alienation, 
to disruption of the human and social 
environment in a variety of ways ranging 
from organized crime to acute pollution 
and urban claustrophobia, and, more 
recently, monetary and economic 
crises".27 
It is, of course, quite true that the 
industrial societies of today are plagued 
by enormous problems and tensions, but 
whether this is the result of modern 
technology is something that has to be 
demonstrated, not taken for granted. It 
is at least arguable that any effort to put 
the clock back by suppressing modern 
technology would compound the pro-
blems and tensions of the world instead 
of easing them. There are remedies for 
pollution and crime that do not involve 
throwing the baby out with the bath 
water. 
27
 Op, cit, p. 257. 
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III 
Development alternatives 
1. Rural and urban development 
It is not necessary to accept the 
back-to-nature implications of the Pug-
wash reasoning in order to agree with the 
basic needs strategists in their emphasis 
on the importance of rural development. 
Much of the hard-core poverty in 
developing countries is concentrated 
among the peasantry in rural areas, and 
greater attention to their needs is 
imperative not only in itself but as a 
means of raising their productivity. 
Moreover, the inadequate absorption of 
labour by urban industry makes it 
necessary to create additional employ-
ment opportunities in rural areas not 
only on the land but in rural industry, 
rural public works and rural services. 
Thus far no controversy arises. 
Sometimes, however, the basic needs 
strategists seem to be suggesting that 
rural development can supply a wholly 
new approach that can replace the 
traditional strategy of industrialization. 
While urban industry led the develop-
ment process in the past, the leading 
sector of the future will, it seems, be the 
rural sector, a viable and comprehensive 
economy in, its own right. 
Thus Ponna Wignaraja writes of "the 
village becoming the focal point of 
development". It is there that the 
creative energies of the people can best 
be mobilized to bring about "a social 
transformation of enormous magnitude" 
indispensable for satisfying their needs. 
"The capital fetishim of the past must 
give way to the fullest utilization of 
labour power and creativity" as well as 
of local resources and appropriate techno-
logy.28 
But neither Wignaraja nor other 
writers in this field have indicated how 
exactly the village is to lead the 
development process, and, in particular, 
what is to happen to the agricultural 
workers released by rising labour pro-
ductivity on the land. 
The problem is a formidable one. In 
the least developed countries, it takes as 
much as eighty to ninety per cent of the 
economically active population, or even 
more, to supply the barest food 
subsistence requirements of the com-
munity. On the other hand, at the levels 
of agricultural productivity obtaining in 
the United States, the food needs of the 
entire population can be supplied by 
approximately 3 per cent of the labour 
force. Long-term development planning 
must therefore provide for the ultimate 
absorption of at least eighty per cent of 
the working populations of the lowest-
income countries into non-agricultural 
employment. Does the new approach to 
development imply that the rural sector 
of the future will generate alternative 
employment for all or most of the 
people released from agriculture? In a 
world rushing headlong towards urban 
chaos, it is easy to see the attractions of 
such an idea, an the scope for studies of 
its feasibility, But it would be a mistake 
to act as if the feasibility of such an 
28
 Ponna Wignaraja, "From the Village to 
the Global Order", Development Dialogue, 1, 
Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala, 1977 
pp. 35-49. 
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approach, in political, economic and 
social terms, had already been de-
monstrated. 
In China, rural industry at present 
occupies approximately 3 per cent of the 
working population, while another 2 per 
cent are engaged in a network of 
extension services covering agriculture, 
public health and industry. Rural indus-
try is certainly not regarded as an 
alternative to medium- and large-scale 
enterprises, but only as a complementary 
element in the industrialization pro-
cess.29 Thus, if rural development were 
to be the spearhead of the development 
strategy of the future, it would have to 
be conceived on a scale far beyond 
anything currently contemplated in 
China. 
There are, of course, powerful 
reasons for the concentration of indus-
tries and associated services in urban 
centres that embrace a great deal more 
than the economies of large-scale ope-
rations. As Nicholas Kaldor has pointed 
out, the advantages of geographic con-
centration lie in the opportunities for 
greater specialization among enterprises 
and the consequent subdivision of 
industrial processes; in the availability of 
labour with the whole range of spe-
cialized skills; in the accessibility of 
engineering and marketing know-how; 
and so forth.30 
29
 Jon Sigurdson, "Rural Industrialization 
in China", World Development, vol. 3, nos. 7 
and 8, July-August 1975, pp. 527-538.' 
30
 Nicholas Kaldor, "The role of modern 
technology in raising the economic standards of 
the less developed countries", in Wayne L. 
Hodges and Matthero A. Kelly (ed.), Technolo-
gical Change and Human Development, An 
International Conference, New York State 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 
Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1970, 
pp. 15-29. 
Unless something occurred to 
remove or offset the advantages of 
geographic concentration, it seems 
doubtful whether the rural sector would, 
in the foreseeable future, be capable of 
taking over from urban industry the 
leadership of the development process. 
The fact that most of the population is 
to be found in the countryside does not 
mean today, any more than it meant in 
eighteenth-century Britain or nine-
teenth-century Germany and the United 
States, that the primary stimulus to 
development will come from the rural 
sector. This is not to say that the urban 
concentrations of the past and present 
provide a satisfactory model for the 
future. An immense effort of imaginative 
planning will be required to overcome 
the defects of contemporary urban 
society. But there is no evidence that 
there will be any less need in the next 
twenty years than there has been since 
the Industrial Revolution for the con-
centration of interdependent manufac-
turing and service facilities in towns, 
although it may prove desirable to place 
limits on the growth of any single urban 
centre.31 
Great as is the preoccupation of the 
basic needs strategists with rural develop-
ment, one of the key issues in this regard 
is often overlooken. Most of the concern 
3
'One of the most disruptive features of 
urban life —traffic congestion— would not be 
difficult to remedy if the political will to do so 
existed. Such is the power of the automobile 
industry that road transport (particularly the 
personally-owned automobile) does not have to 
bear anything approaching the social costs of 
the congestion and pollution that it causes. 
Rectification of this anomalous situation by 
drastic restrictions or heavy taxation on 
personal use of automobiles in central cities, 
combined with adequate provision of public 
transport, would greatly increase the viability 
and amenity of urban living. 
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is, quite rightly, addressed to improving 
the economic prospects of the small 
family farm through a variety of 
convergent measures. The fruits of rising 
productivity on the small farm are, 
however, likely to be consumed by the 
occupants themselves, so that relatively 
little contribution may be made to the 
marketable surplus of production over 
consumption. There is abundant eviden-
ce that the growth of' employment-
generating activities outside agriculture 
has been constrained far more by the 
size of the food surplus available for sale 
to the non-agricultural sector, than by 
any other single factor. On the one hand, 
efforts to expand non-agricultural em-
ployment faster than the marketable sur-
plus of food have foundered on the infla-
tionary spiral that resulted. On the other 
hand, the size of the agricultural surplus, 
which determines the purchasing power 
of the farm sector for industrial 
products, has helped to limit the growth 
of industrial employment. Although no 
programme for rural development can 
therefore be complete without a pres-
cription for increasing the marketable 
supply of food, an adequate treatment 
of the subject can rarely be found.32 
Some members of the basic needs 
school show a certain reticence about 
structural change in the rural sector. 
Respects are paid to the need for 
agrarian reform, but, as the ILO report 
puts it, "agrarian reform is practicable 
only if political forces with more 
strength than those of the landlords can 
32
 The ILO's report to the World Employ-
ment Conference confines itself to saying that 
any transitional shortages of basic goods can be 
met by changing the composition of imports or 
increasing their volume, by food aid, or by a 
temporary rationing system(op. cit, pp. 67-68). 
The problem is, however, of a much more than 
transitional character. 
be mobilized".33 An alternative view 
night be that the entire fabric of rural 
development programmes featuring so 
prominently in the basic needs strategy 
would be of doubtful value in a 
considerable number of countries in the 
absence of land reform. 
2. The role of industry and 
the modern sector 
Among those who think about these 
matters in the industrial countries it has 
come to be held distinctly unfashionable 
- o r worse-34 to entertain the view that 
industrial transformation is the key to 
the development of low-income coun-
tries. Yet there is nothing very new or 
shocking about the idea, which still 
commands general support in the de-
veloping world. It is over two hundred 
years since Adam Smith pointed to the 
increasing returns generated by manu-
facturing activities and explained them 
in terms of the division of labour, or 
specialization, which itself depended on 
the extent of the market. 
Paul Streeten has shown that "to rise 
above poverty, industrialization is ne-
cessary, for industrialization means the 
application of power to production and 
transport. Output and consumption per 
head can rise towards the desired 
modern levels only with the help of 
mechanical aids. In this sense, develop-
ment, including rural development, is 
industrialization". And he goes on to 
point out that there is no evidence of an 
inevitable conflict between high rates of 
33
 Op. cit., p. 67. 
34
 Michael Lipton refers to "the dark 
neo-Stalinist night in which almots all 'develop-
ment experts' have lurched around since 1945, 
muttering half-coherent praises of instant 
industrialization". See World Development, vol. 
5, no. 3, March 1977, p. 267. 
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industrial growth and the achievement of 
other development objectives such as 
rural development and the equitable 
distribution of income; if anything, as he 
says, there is evidence to the contrary. In 
many, though not in all cases, the 
achievement of social objectives has been 
consistent with high rates of industrial 
growth and, indeed, has depended on 
them.35 
Despite the disappointing rate of 
absorption of labour by industry in 
developing countries in recent years, 
there cannot be any doubt that faster 
growth means a more rapid rate of 
increase in employment. Employment 
does not rise as quickly as industrial 
output because of increases in produc-
tivity, which are due to economies of 
scale, technological progress, and the 
process of 'learning by doing'. However, 
analyses of growth rates of output, 
employment and productivity by Ver-
doorn, Kaldor and others have led to the 
conclusion that each percentage addition 
to the growth of industrial output 
requires, in general orders of magnitude, 
a 0.5-per-cent increase in man/hours of 
employment and a 0.5-per-cent increase 
in productivity.36 
Basic needs strategists are as reticent 
about the role of the modern sector in 
poverty-oriented development as they 
are about the growth requirements of 
the economy in general. It is, however, 
usually left to be inferred that since 
modern industry has not been able to 
absorb as much of the labour force as 
had been hoped or expected, it has little 
Paul Streeten, "Industrialization in a 
Unified Development Strategy", World Develop-
ment, vol 3, no. I.January 1975, pp. 1-2. 
36
 Nicholas Kaldor, Strategic Factors in 
Economic Development, '"ornell University, 
1967, p. 17. 
or no role to play in a basic needs 
strategy and that a fundamental shift 
towards a labour-intensive pattern of 
industry is indispensable for the future. 
Such a shift would, it is thought, be 
facilitated if a concept of the interna-
tional division of labour were adopted 
whereby industrially advanced countries 
specialized in capital-intensive and de-
veloping countries in labour-intensive 
industries, and exchanged their output 
to mutual advantage. 
The comments of Charles Paolillo, 
staff consultant to the United States 
House of Representatives Committee on 
International Relations, who attended 
the World Employment Conference, are 
of particular interest in this context. He 
suggests that "many countries may well 
want to take steps towards a basic needs 
strategy while at the same time ex-
panding the modern sector, increasing 
the use of advanced technology, and 
strengthening the heavy industrial base". 
He goes on to say that their reasons for 
acting in this way "may include politics, 
prestige, psychology, security and self-
reliance".37 
Paolillo appears to be implying that 
"expanding the modern sector" would 
not normally be regarded as part of a 
basic needs strategy. Indeed, such an 
idea would have to be justified, in his 
view, on one or more of several grounds, 
among which he places politics and 
prestige in the forefront, and none of 
which includes rational economic cal-
culation (except perhaps to the extent 
that this is involved in self-reliance). 
From this angle of vision, then, modern 
37
 See A Basic Human Needs Strategy of 
Development: Staff Report on the World 
Employment Conference, Washington D.C., 
U.S. Government Printing Office, September 
1976, p. 11. 
BASIC NEEDS OR COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT / Sidney Dell 23 
industrial installations in developing 
countries can be explained only in 
non-economic terms. 
3. The labour-intensive strategy 
Yet there are strong reasons for doubting 
whether the pattern of industrial specia-
lization in developing countries can be 
determined even in the short run by the 
simple criterion of the amount of labour 
employed per unit of capital. It is often 
taken for granted that labour-intensive 
techniques are capital-saving, but in 
many instances they certainly are not. In 
fact the capital cost of labour-intensive 
techniques is often quite high. For 
example, the ILO Employment Mission 
to Colombia was informed that the 
capital-output ratio in the traditional 
sector of Colombian industry averaged 
about twice as high as in the modern 
sector. Some insight into possible 
reasons for this kind of unexpected 
result is provided by studies of cotton 
textile production in India. These have 
shown that cottage industry employs 
substantially more capital per unit of 
output than factory production, prin-
cipally because the much longer time 
required for manual operations involves 
the tying-up of far greater amounts of 
working capital per unit of output. 
Thus capital-intensive techniques are 
not necessarily associated with higher 
capital costs per unit of output than 
those of labour-intensive techniques: on 
the contrary, there is reason to believe 
that over a wide range of industry 
capital-output ratios are actually lower 
for capital-intensive than for labour-
intensive techniques. 
In general, labour-intensive tech-
niques are clearly advantageous to 
developing countries only if they permit 
the same volume of output to be 
produced at no greater capital cost. The 
available evidence suggests that in many 
core industrial processes techniques 
requiring a large volume of investment 
per worker generate a far higher level of 
output, as well as of output per worker, 
while capital outlays per unit of output 
are no greater than for less capital-in-
tensive techniques. 
The principal qualification to be 
made in respect of this conclusion is that 
in some cases the choice of a capital-
intensive technique may be precluded by 
the fact that the domestic market is too 
small to permit the advantages of the 
technique to be realized. At the same 
time there may be difficulties in 
breaking into export markets. 
There are a number of ancillary 
activities, notably construction and 
materials handling, as well as services, in 
which the use of labour-intensive 
methods may yield economies in the use 
of capital per unit of output. However, 
the successful application of labour-
intensive methods in large-scale road and 
dam construction has been found to 
depend on a high degree of managerial 
efficiency in the deployment of labour 
as well as on tight labour discipline. 
Failing this, capital-intensive methods 
may be preferable even here. 
The point is often made that 
capital-intensive techniques have in 
effect been subsidized in developing 
countries through low interest rates and 
the remission of duties on imported 
equipment embodying advanced techno-
logy, coupled with high levels of 
protection on the finished products 
manufactured with such equipment. 
Examples can be cited in which the value 
added by heavily protected modern 
industry in certain developing countries 
was actually negative at world market 
prices: motor-vehicle production in some 
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of the Latin American countries is a case 
in point. 
It is doubtful whether subsidization 
of such magnitude, especially of luxury 
consumer durables, can be justified. 
Equally, however, it would be inad-
visable to introduce distortions of 
precisely the opposite character, namely, 
those that would result from indiscrimi-
nate incentives or subsidies to labour-
intensive technologies. There are instan-
ces in which the subsidization of 
capital-intensive as well as of labour-
intensive techniques can be justified: 
both may find their place in a purposeful 
development strategy so long as de-
cisions are based on rational calculation 
rather than on general doctrine. 
Notwithstanding the above consi-
derations, it appears to be implied in 
some of the employment-maximizing 
strategies that labour-intensive tech-
niques should be adopted even though 
they do not yield a higher aggregate 
output, and even though total capital 
requirements may be greater. This, 
however, is a self-defeating strategy 
under almost any conditions. It amounts 
to saddling industry with the additional 
costs of a public works programme. This 
inevitably makes it more difficult to gain 
export markets and may even necessitate 
high levels of protection against cheaper 
imports from abroad. In such cases it 
would obviously be preferable to adopt 
capital-intensive techniques in the in-
dustries concerned, and use the savings 
in capital cost to help in financing 
employment-creating public works pro-
grammes of value to the community. 
4. 'Appropriate' technology 
It is nevertheless true that most of the 
technology employed in developing 
countries was originally designed for use 
in the quite different conditions of 
industrial countries, and has usually 
undergone only minimal adaptation to 
the requirements of a new environment. 
Much greater efforts are therefore 
needed, as the basic needs strategists 
emphasize, to design or adapt techno-
logies that would be more 'appropriate' 
to the conditions prevailing in develop-
ing countries. 
Whether a programme to promote 
'appropriate' technology would bring 
about a significant change in the 
strategic options available to developing 
countries is far from clear. In the first 
place the mobilization of. an adequate 
scale of R and D for this purpose will 
take more time than is generally realized, 
and the production of usable prototypes 
may take even longer. Moreover, account 
will have to be taken of the fact that 
differences in factor prices and in other 
relevant conditions among developing 
countries are greater than average dif-
ferences between developing and de-
veloped countries. Consequently there is 
no technology that is equally 'appro-
priate' for all developing countries, and 
adaptations will themselves have to be 
graduated accordingly. Secondly, it will 
be necessary to accommodate the effects 
of changes in factor price ratios over the 
lifetime of durable equipment: for 
example, at a rate of growth of seven per 
cent per annum real wages double in 
ten years. Thus the problems involved 
in elaborating 'appropriate' technology 
over a significant range of industry are 
immensely complex, and for many of 
the most important industrial processes 
solutions cannot even be envisaged at 
this stage, let alone anticipated. Mean-
while life must go on, and choices will 
have to be made from the options 
available at present. 
The application of up-to-date scien-
BASIC NEEDS OR COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT / Sidney Dell 25 
tifie and engineering know-how could 
undoubtedly help to improve the perfor-
mance of traditional techniques. 
Whether the improvement could ever be 
sufficient to outweigh the productive 
advantages of capital-intensive techni-
ques in a major part of industry is open 
to doubt. In many and perhaps most 
cases, traditional techniques do not lend 
themselves to development beyond a 
certain point, because of such factors as 
their inability to accommodate high 
rates of power utilization. It would have 
been useless, for example, to try and 
harness a steam engine to a stage-coach. 
In fact, no matter how much scientific 
and technological ingenuity had been 
invested in trying to bring pre-railways 
methods of transport up to date, it is 
scarcely conceivable that any system 
competitive with the railway could have 
been invented at the time, under any 
configuration of factor price ratios. 
All this in no way diminishes the 
need for an effort of adaptation, and 
indeed of innovation, to be begun, and 
on a massive scale. In fact, this is a case 
where the minimum critical mass of 
resources required is exceedingly large. 
This is not only because of theimmense 
variety and complexity of industrial 
technology, and the enormous differen-
ces among developing countries, and 
hence in the degree of adaptation 
required in particular cases, but because 
small amounts of R and D devoted to 
'appropriate' technology are likely to 
produce their results too slowly for these 
ever to be put into practice, since the 
dynamics of technological progress will 
have rendered them obsolete before they 
are applied. One can only hope that the 
strong support of the industrial countries 
for a basic needs strategy of develop-
ment will be accompanied by a recog-
nition of the need for this kind of 
massive effort. 
Even if adequate resources were 
allocated, and a successful R and D 
effort were mounted, there can be no 
presumption that the new and 'appro-
priate' technologies would be more 
labour-intensive —at any rate in the core 
processes of the principal branches of 
industry— than the technologies now 
imported without adaptation. Their 
'appropriateness' may lie rather in the 
capacity to achieve maximum cost-
effectiveness at a lower level of output 
than existing technologies require. 
The issue of 'appropriateness' must, 
however, be seen in terms of the 
products themselves, as well as in terms 
of the technologies required to produce 
them. As Frances Stewart puts it: "When 
techniques designed for use in rich 
countries are transferred to much poorer 
countries, the products produced by 
those techniques are transferred too. The 
two —the techniques and the products-
are inseparable aspects of the techno-
logy. Thus products designed for con-
sumption in much richer societies are 
transferred to economies where, on 
average, incomes are much lower".38 In 
the case of durable consumer goods a 
further adverse consequence may ensue: 
the creation and maintenance of an 
adequate market may require —over and 
above the kind of socially uneconomic 
protection referred to earlier- a high 
degree of inequality in the distribution 
of income. 
There are, of course, various ways of 
preventing the diversion of resources 
into luxury consumption, including the 
creation of strong disincentives to 
38
 Frances Stewart, Technology and 
Underdevelopment, London, Macmillan, 1977, 
P. 78. 
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domestic manufacture, the levying of 
high duties on imports, and the redis-
tribution of income through taxation 
and public expenditure. It is, in fact, a 
surprising feature of the basic needs 
approach that far less attention is usually 
devoted to direct and practical measures 
of income redistribution than to a 
reorientation of development strategy 
that may well turn out to be as nebulous 
as it is ambitious, and which can in any 
event hardly be relied on to yield the 
desired result. We have already noted 
that the treatment of land reform is 
likewise often more tentative than one 
might have expected from a school that 
is profoundly concerned about rural 
poverty. In both these instances there 
appears to be an implicit hope or 
expectation that a basic needs strategy, 
by encouraging poverty-oriented de-
velopment projects, might be able to 
sidestep the issue of direct redistribution 
of land and income. Perhaps the political 
and social strains of such a strategy 
would be less severe than those of a 
programme of land reform and tax 
reform; but the costs in terms of slowing 
down the rate of modernization of the 
economy may be high, while the benefits 
may prove quite elusive. 
5. The international division 
of labour 
The idea of an international division of 
labour between developed and develop-
ing countries based on labour and capital 
intensities is not viable for at least two 
reasons. In the first place, just as it does 
not necessarily follow that labour-
surplus countries should adopt labour-
intensive technologies across the board, 
so also there are no grounds for 
presuming that the comparative ad-
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vantage of such countries in world trade 
lies exclusively in the export of labour-
intensive products. 
Any such principle for the inter-
national division of labour is in any case 
ruled out because the developed coun-
tries are not less opposed to in than the 
developing countries are. Imports of 
labour-intensive products hit the most 
vulnerable industries of the developed 
countries - industries that often employ 
the poorest workers and members of 
minority groups. While a few developing 
countries have been able to establish 
strong positions in world textile markets, 
further export growth is under severe 
and discriminatory constraints, and there 
is no possibility at all that developing 
countries generally could look to textile 
markets as potential sources of substan-
tial expansion in export earnings. The 
first international agreement on res-
tricting textile imports from developing 
countries was adopted in 1962 as a 
temporary measure to be applied 
"during the next few years". The 
restrictions have, however, been renewed 
periodically ever since, and the rate of 
expansion of imports has been curtailed 
to the point at which there appears to be 
an intention to avoid the need for 
adjustment by preventing any significant 
further encroachment on domestic 
markets. Similar considerations apply to 
other restrictions on trade in manu-
factures with developing countries, 
whether imposed by importing coun-
tries, or by exporting countries under 
duress. 
Thus the idea we have been consi-
dering is not only poor economics. It is 
also quite impracticable in a world of 
growing protectionism, in which it is the 
labour-intensive industries that are the 
weakest in the developed countries. 
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6. The Chinese example 
The point that never emerges either from 
the ILO report or from other versions of 
the basic needs strategy is that there is 
no necessary incompatibility between 
rapid development of the modern sector 
and promotion of new employment 
opportunities by more traditional 
methods in other sectors. If the Chinese 
model, which the basic needs strategists 
frequently quote with approval, proves 
anything, it surely proves that. 
Chinese experience is often cited in 
support of the labour-intensive, small-
project approach to industry combined 
with the concentration of major re-
sources and intensive efforts upon rural 
development. But the parallel drawn is 
often founded on a misunderstanding of 
1. Sould UNDP have a 
development strategy? 
The preceding discussion brings us to the 
second main issue of this paper 
- namely, should the aid donors in 
general, and UNDP in particular, use 
their resources to further a poverty-
oriented or basic needs strategy of 
development? 
Except in the Netherlands and the 
39
 See Suzanne Paine, "Balanced Develop-
ment: Maoist Conception and Chinese Prac-
tice", World Development, vol. 4, no. 4, April 
1976. 
that experience. The Chinese strategy is 
to walk on two legs, not on one, which is 
not a bad idea if the pedestrian is to 
remain upright. China encourages the 
simultaneous development of industry 
and agriculture, making use of the most 
modern capital-intensive technologies as 
well as of traditional methods of 
labour-intensive production. Provision is 
made for a minimum level of con-
sumption accessible to all, while at the 
same time heavy industry is the key 
industrial activity that is given the 
highest priority in the allocation of 
resources,39 Thus the Chinese model is 
based on a strategy of comprehensive 
development quite different from what 
is usually understood as the basic needs 
approach, even though China clearly 
does have a definite policy on providing 
for a minimum level of living for all. 
Scandinavian countries, the constituency 
for aid programmes in the developed 
countries is at the best of times relatively 
weak. Evidence that the distribution of 
income is becoming less rather than 
more equitable in some of the deve-
loping countries has been grist to the 
mill of the opponents of aid, who make 
the persuasive point that it is irrational 
to transfer income from poor tax-payers 
in developed countries to the well-to-do 
of the developing world.40 
4 0
 The latter proposition is, of course, 
valid even where the distribution of income in 
recipient countries improves. 
IV 
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Thus acceptance by the developing 
countries of a commitment to a 
poverty-oriented development strategy 
has come to be regarded in the industrial 
countries as indispensable if aid program-
mes are to be sustained. In fact the case 
for such a strategy emerged in the 
developed countries long before the 
World Employment Conference. Charles 
Paolillo notes that "The basic needs 
strategy bears a striking resemblance to 
the 'participation' strategy of develop-
ment that underlies the 'new directions' 
in development assistance which the 
United States Agency for International 
Development (AID) has been pursuing 
over the past several years, in accordance 
with legislation put forth initially by the 
House International Relations Com-
mittee and enacted into lav/ in 1973 and 
1975".41 Similarly, in a Blue Book 
issued in October 1975, the United 
Kingdom Government stated that "...we 
and other aid donors are now adapting 
our aid policies to give more help to the 
poorest countries and the poorest people 
within these countries".42 
Why, then, are developing countries 
reluctant to enter into a compact 
whereby development assistance would 
be linked to programmes in aid of the 
poor? In the first place, they resent 
what they regard as an unwarranted 
assumption by the developed countries 
that it is only they who are concerned 
about the poor, and that the developing 
countries have to be offered the bait of 
foreign aid to induce them to show equal 
concern. The United Kingdom Blue 
41
 A Basic Human Needs Strategy of 
Development, op cit, p. 1. 
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 United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas 
Development, The Changing Emphasis in 
British Aid Policies: More Help for the Poorest, 
H.M. Stationery Office, Cmnd. 6270, October 
1975. p. 2. 
Book recognizes that these are "highly 
sensitive matters at the heart of the 
political process in all countries both 
developed and developing", and that 
efforts to exert pressure in this field 
might well be resisted even by countries 
otherwise favourably inclined towards 
poverty-oriented development.43 The 
Chairman of the OECD's Development 
Assistance Committee writes that "ex-
perience with the African Club du Sahel 
indicates that no nation in this century 
would be likely to accept a minimal 
standard of life as an objective of policy 
for more than a temporary emergency 
period".44 What is more serious is that 
attempts to reach agreement on minimal 
poverty lines are certain to be deeply 
resented by developing-country leaders 
and peoples as unduly technocratic and 
paternalistic on the part of the affluent 
North. Moreover, the developed coun-
tries carry little conviction in this field at 
a time when unemployment and depri-
vation among their own disadvantaged 
and minority groups have risen to levels 
not seen since the Great Depression. 
It is not as though the campaign for 
poverty-oriented programmes of de-
velopment is accompanied by offers of a 
substantially larger volume of aid in 
support of such programmes. On the 
contrary, there is deep concern among 
developing countries that narrowing the 
scope of the international community's 
development objectives so as to con-
centrate upon poverty in a restricted 
sense of that term may be intended to 
provide a rationale for eroding the trade 
and aid commitments of the industrial 
countries. According to the World Bank, 
official development assistance declined 
43
 Ibid., chapter III, paragraphs 3-4. 
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 The OUCD Observer, November 1977, 
p. 20. 
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as a percentage of the total GNP of 
developed countries from 0.52 in 1960 
to about 0.33 in the mid-1970s, and 
there is no prospect in the near future of 
a really significant move towards the 
General Assembly's target of 0.7 per 
cent of GNP.45 At the same time the 
trade objectives of the United Nations 
International Development Strategy 
seem farther than ever from realization 
as the commodity problem remains 
unresolved, and, as noted earlier, the 
new protectionism of the industrial 
countries is particularly severe in its 
treatment of manufactured imports from 
developing countries. There is con-
sequently a profound uneasiness among 
developing countries lest the poverty 
slogan and the basic needs approach are 
being used to undermine the Inter-
national Development Strategy and to 
divert attention from the failure to meet 
the international obligations it sets forth. 
In addition, the developing countries 
consider that concentration of aid 
efforts on the poorest 40 per cent of the 
populations of the poorest countries 
ignores the fact that in most countries 
the majority of the remaining 60 per 
cent are, by any reasonable standards of 
basic needs, themselves extremely poor 
and deprived. It is, on this view, a 
dubious procedure to separate out the 
poorest 40 per cent in, say Tanzania 
when four-fifths, of the population are 
probably living at levels below the 100 
dollars per capita line.46 
45
 Robert McNamara, Address to the 
Board of Governors, World Bank, September 
26, 1977, Annex III. 
46
 According to Hollis Chenery et. al. 
Redistribution with Growth, Oxford University 
Press, 1974, table 1.2, 72.9 per cent of the 
population of Tanzania was living below the 
poverty line of a per capita income of 75 
dollars (at 1971 prices) in 1969. The 
It is not necessarily in the poorest 
countries that the greatest inequities in 
income distribution are to be found. 
Even if it were regarded as desirable and 
efficacious to use aid programmes to 
exert leverage on the developing coun-
tries in favour of the poor which is itself 
open to question for the reason given in 
the United Kingdom Blue Book, that 
leverage should presumably be directed 
towards the countries where inequities 
are greatest, rather than towards coun-
tries where the overwhelming majority 
are so poor that poverty-oriented de-
velopment is virtually the same thing as 
development for all. But it is obvious 
that aid cannot be used as a means of 
pressure upon a country that receives no 
aid, and it is the countries that have been 
excluded from programmes of con-
cessional assistance because of their 
relatively high incomes that could do the 
most for their poorest citizens. 
Thus there is more than a possibility 
that the pressure will be applied most 
strongly at precisely the point where it is 
least needed, and will not be felt at all in 
the cases where resources are indeed 
available for making significant progress 
towards the eradication of poverty, if 
the will were there. 
2. The transfer of development 
strategies: the basic needs 
approach 
Earlier we saw that while there is 
unquestionably a need for more 
equitable distribution of the gains from 
development, the strategy devised by the 
corresponding percentages for some other 
countries were as follows: Dahomey, 90.1; 
Chad, 77.5; Burma, 71.0; Madagascar, 69.9; 
India, 66.9; Sri Lanka, 63.5; Sierra Leone, 61.5; 
Niger, 59.9. 
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basic needs school to achieve this goal is 
at best highly controversial and at worst 
likely to slow down the process of 
development and with it any real hope 
for improving the living standards of the 
poor. 
But even if the above analysis were 
too pessimistic, and even if it could be 
shown that rural development and 
small-scale labour-intensive industry held 
the key to development with social 
justice, it still would not follow that the 
international agencies have any com-
parative advantage in planning, designing 
and implementing projects in these 
p articular fields. The simplistic 
assumption is often made that the best 
way for the international community to 
improve the lot of the rural and urban 
poor is to go to them directly, and 
involve them in internationally-
supported projects, multilateral or bila-
teral. Such projects frequently neglect 
the most basic preconditions for success. 
3. Rural development 
In her important book on The Design of 
Rural Development, Urna Lele stresses 
the crucial importance of appropriate 
policies and commitment of resources by 
governments, without which rural de-
velopment programmes cannot succeed. 
In the field of broad policy, for 
example, if the system of land tenure 
precludes participation of the lowest 
income groups in rural development 
programmes, land reform may be an 
indispensable prerequisite for the success 
of such programmes. Likewise the 
pricing policies of the government or of 
marketing boards may have to be 
adjusted to permit low-income groups to 
benefit from increases in productivity.47 
Popular participation in and support 
for rural development programmes are 
also essential, and the general ineffec-
tiveness of past attempts to secure such 
support is noteworthy. As Urna Lele 
points out, most programmes have 
"suffered from poor knowledge of the 
sociocultural and institutional environ-
ment in which they were to be 
implemented" combined with "extreme 
scarcity of trained local manpower".48 
These considerations prompt the con-
clusion that 'without a very major 
commitment of resources by national 
governments to rural development and, 
equally important, to suitable training of 
the manpower necessary for expansion 
of these services, intensity49 of most of 
these programs cannot be replicated on a 
large enough scale to reach a mass of the 
rural population in the foreseeable 
future".50 
It can hardly be said that in the 
entire spectrum of development support 
that international agencies are capable of 
providing, rural development is the 
sector where their comparative advan-
tage is greatest. Even if it were true that 
rural development should have the 
highest claim on the total resources 
available for development (which is itself 
far from certain), it still would not 
follow that it should also rank first in 
claims on external resources, which, it 
should be remembered, represent only a 
Urna Lele, The Design of Rural 
Development, published for the World Bank by 
the Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 




 "Intensity" is roughly measured by the 
ratio of extension workers to farmers. 
50
 Ibid., p. 69. 
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small proportion of the total - less than 
ten per cent on average. 
It stands to reason that no outsiders, 
however well-meaning, can be expected 
to have the intimate knowledge of the 
sociocultural and institutional environ-
ment that Urna Lele points to as crucial 
in any such programme. Indeed, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, the 
outsider will not even have the minimum 
understanding of the local language that 
is indispensable if close contact with the 
people is to be achieved and maintained. 
Consider two countries, A and B, 
with similar per capita income levels and 
similar sectors of extreme poverty. Let 
us suppose that A has a laissez-faire 
government that does not believe in 
direct domestic aid for the poor but 
prefers to rely on market forces to put 
things right. B, on the other hand, has an 
active programme of employment gene-
ration for both rural and urban poor; 
and a system of taxes and subsidies that 
effectively narrows the internal per 
capita income differentials, and puts a 
floor under the real income of the 
poorest. 
UNDP proposes, and country A 
accepts, a programme of integrated rural 
development. Efforts are made to raise 
the productivity of the small producer. 
Gradually it is noticed, however, that the 
fruits of the productivity increase are 
not retained by the producers but are 
passed on by them, involuntarily, to the 
industrial population in the form of 
lower food prices. The suggestion is 
made by the UNDP team leader that the 
government should consider supporting 
producer prices, but the government 
replies that Nobel prizewinner Milton 
Friedman is against such interference 
with the market. 
Country B's officials do not want an 
externally financed rural development 
programme at all; they feel that they 
understand the rural development pro-
blems of their country better than any 
external agency, and do not need any 
external inputs in solving them. UNDP's 
comparative advantage, they feel, lies in 
helping them to obtain and master 
advanced technology. They have some 
mineral resources already being ex-
ploited, and would like UNDP to help in 
establishing facilities for semi-manu-
facture. The programme will not gene-
rate much employment and it certainly 
will not go directly to the poorest 
sectors. But, says the government, it will 
accelerate the rate of growth of the 
economy as a whole, and the benefits 
will be redistributed by the government 
so that the poor obtain a more than 
proportional share. 
Which of these two programmes is 
more effective as a means of dealing with 
poverty? Views may differ, but 
certainly the second approach is not 
obviously inferior to the first. 
It is no doubt considerations of this 
kind that prompted the United Kingdom 
Government to take an extremely 
cautious approach to poverty-oriented 
development in its Blue Book cited 
above. The Blue Book suggests that a 
poverty-focused aid policy "has to 
proceed by means of detailed program-
mes related carefully to the cir-
cumstances and wishes of each country, 
and not by way of general guidelines to 
be applied regardless in all countries". It 
argues against direct methods whereby 
the donor would "specify in advance the 
economic or social sectors, types of 
projects, geographical areas, or particular 
beneficiary groups within a country to 
which it wishes to confine, or preclude 
the use of, its aid",51 
51
 Op. cit,., chapter III, paragraph 4. 
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Programmes of poverty-oriented de-
velopment have nevertheless gone ahead 
with the best of intentions, and the 
expected difficulties have materialized. 
In a certain Asian country, for example, 
a large-scale development project en-
countered severe problems resulting at 
least in part from the lack of familiarity 
of the international agency concerned 
with the cultural and political cross-
currents among the host of small 
communities that were involved. More 
surprising, the agency did not foresee the 
consequences of upgrading provision for 
water supply, sewage and other improve-
ments in isolation from more com-
prehensive development measures (that 
would, of course, have required a large 
multiple of the already substantial 
resources made available for the project). 
As the improvements raised the value of 
land and housing in the area concerned, 
the impoverished occupants felt com-
pelled to sell out to richer people and 
move to slums on the outskirts of the 
country's capital city. 
Again, at a recent intergovernmental 
meeting to discuss the basic needs 
strategy, a representative of one of the 
poorest African countries described how 
a certain international agency had 
created "a State within a State" in his 
The basic needs school has made a 
contribution to the development dia-
logue by emphasizing the importance of 
equitable distribution of the benefits of 
development. But it claims too much. 
There is no such thing, thus far, as a 
basic needs strategy that clearly defines 
the direction to be taken by the 
economy as a whole. 
country. The motives underlying the 
project in question were no doubt of the 
highest and best; the agency was 
determined that the experiment should 
succeed, that a significant impact should 
be made on the poor of the area 
concerned, and that nothing should be 
allowed to interfere with the progress 
made. But in order to achieve this result 
the agency felt compelled to assert a 
degree of control over the project, and a 
degree of protection from outside 
influences, that isolated it from the rest 
of the country. Moreover, conditions 
were created in the project area that 
made it quite impossible for the country 
in question to repeat the experiment 
elsewhere. Thus a purely artificial entity 
had been established with no spread 
effects to the economy as - whole, and 
posing a serious problem for the 
government once the international 
agency concerned leaves the scene. 
External support for a basic needs 
approach does not have to consist of 
basic needs projects. International 
agencies have acquired a high degree of 
competence in a number of areas, and it 
is in those areas that their efforts can be 
most productive, whatever the. overall 
development strategy of the country 
concerned. 
While apparently radical in intent, 
the basic needs approach is in fact to a 
considerable extent backward-looking. 
This is particularly evident in the 
absence of unambiguous provision for 
the structural changes that are indispen-
sable in releasing the potential for 
development, and in the playing-down of 
the role of modern industry and modern 
Conclusions 
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technology. Even in the rural sector, 
proposals for structural change seem 
hesitant and half-hearted. 
It does not follow that because a 
country has egalitarian development 
goals, it will necessarily wish to give 
overriding priority to the attainment of 
certain absolute targets for consumption. 
It may prefer to hold down present and 
short-term consumption in order to 
permit a more rapid rate of growth and 
structural transformation. The success of 
such a strategy may well depend on the 
fairness with which the associated 
burden of deprivation is distributed 
within the society as a whole, 
Just as experience has shown that 
the success of efforts to limit the growth 
of population depends on placing such 
efforts squarely within the context of 
general economic and social develop-
ment, so also will programmes to assist 
the poor succeed only if established as 
part of a broader development strategy. 
The goals of growth and equity are not 
only compatible but interdependent, and 
their achievement certainly does not call 
for weakening or slowing down the 
growth of the modern sector, or for 
one-sided reliance on labour-intensive 
technologies. 
Finally, however important it may 
be for countries to make more deliberate 
provision for the needs of their poorest 
citizens, it does not follow that inter-
national agencies have any special 
competence or expertise to offer in 
dealing with poverty problems through 
projects addressed directly to the poor. 
On the contrary, lack of familiarity with 
the complex political, economic, social 
and cultural problems of assisting the 
rural and urban poor should prompt the 
agencies to offer their resources and 
services in the areas where they know 
from past experience that they can 
perform well. They do, however, have a 
responsibility to advise governments on 
the goals that the latter have freely 
accepted in international forums, and on 
the means of achieving those goals 
within the framework of each natio-
nally-determined strategy. 
But the agencies should not aspire to 
be leaders in development theory or the 
principal authorities on the development 
process; and they have no mandate to 
impose particular development strategies 
on member countries. Development is a 
long-term task requiring from the inter-
national agencies steadiness and per-
sistence, as well as a certain humility and 
restraint; a sense of proportion res-
pecting their own capacities and the 
importance of what they do; and the 
strict avoidance of both complacency 
and evangelism, together with the ups 
and downs of development fashion. 
